Inside USA's "independent" Safety Board,
offered to the court, in Gibson v NTSB,
Three Board Members endorsed that mysterious document:
"... Chairman HALL, Vice Chairman FRANCIS, and Member HAMMERSCHMIDT
concurred in the disposition of this petition ..."
Attorneys then asked that the
9th Circuit Court of Appeals review
the NTSB's May 4th '95 denial of Gibson's Petition,
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1153(b):
Argued and Submitted November 5, 1996.
"... At issue is the NTSB's denial of a petition to reconsider ...
...We do not have ... jurisdiction to review the NTSB's action.
Jurisdiction is a question of law ... no court has directly addressed the issue
whether Title 49 U.S.C. § 1153, the Independent Safety Board Act,
grants jurisdiction over an NTSB denial of a petition ...
The NTSB regulations . . . the NTSB's complete discretion
to conduct its investigations as it sees fit.
The denial of Gibson's petition falls within
NTSB's unreviewable discretion.
Failure - Interactions
Note that NTSB-staff did NOT disclose the author of that document.
Since none of the three Board Members named as signatories
ever qualified on the Boeing-727,
(for purposes of ascribing Scientific Misconduct) remains unclear:
an engineer at Boeing?? a staff-manager at NTSB?
? WHO was or is NTSB's "accountable executive"?
In this 4May95 NTSB response to the legal challenge,
in the court-case of Gibson v NTSB,
the actual evidence, Heading data, was omitted by NTSB :
-- instead NTSB-staff flatly mischaracterized
"... underlines how little influence board members often have
when faced with an entrenched management team . . ."
The Economist Nov' 19, 2018, Business, Bartleby
That document, the NTSB's denial-response, had remained unknown to other investigators.
The engineer-investigators were unaware that
the legal-side of the NTSB had responded (on May 4th '95) to one of the Petitions against AAR-81-8:
none of the investigators from the various parties
had ever heard about any NTSB response to the various Petitions.
The earliest NTSB website had listed NTSB responses to Petitions of Reconsideration --
to any of the 1990's petitions against AAR-81-8.
Similarly, during the mid-'90's, NTSB employees had copies of
an NTSB LIST of those petitions that required further attention, and a future response.
The petitions against AAR-81-8 were then listed as still open, pending future actions by NTSB-staff.
Currently, NTSB does not disclose any compilation (listing) of its responses to petitions,
nor any list of still-open petitions.
NTSB has so far refused to openly verify that any May 4th '95- response was actually created by NTSB;
the NTSB's 2014 FOIA response disclosed
The only acknowledgement of that May 4th '95 NTSB- response- letter
was that item cited in a court decision
-- nothing from NTSB to acknowledge that any May 4th'95 response existed.
to insure that NTSB rule 845.41 (Petitions) operates as intended.
the NTSB staff-managers' final "cover-up".
an almost comical deception, whereby inside the NTSB,
after NTSB's refusal to respond to any of the §845.41-Petitions against AAR-81-8,
and NTSB's refusal to comply with their own rules regarding Petitions :
Gibson's attorneys sought judicial relief in this matter.
He petitioned the Court to compel the NTSB to act on his Petition to Reconsider (the Petition dated 2May'91). That court denied Gibson's first request. Then his attorneys filed a timely appeal with Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
[the first to explain Yorke's analysis]
had cited numerous errs in the NTSB AAR-81-8
(damaged aircraft components mislabeled or misidentified),
errs which might have contributed to the
inability of NTSB-staff investigators to correlate the direct evidence;
errs which further confused the documentation in such a way that
the NTSB had provided party-investigators with
about items in the Trail of Debris.
Closer examination of that NTSB-denial letter dated May 4th'95, quickly revealed "errs" that were beyond the technical "errata" found in AAR-81-8: The foundation for the NTSB's May 4th '95 denial-letter, denying "reconsideration" for the Captain Gibson Petition (dated 2May91), was their newly fabricated "facts" about the direct evidence: That direct evidence was first examined during on-scene documentation of "wreckage" (the damaged aircraft parked on taxiway at DTW). The Systems Group had documented a main leakage of hydraulic fluid, from the torn hydraulic- lines near the damaged RHS- Main Landing Gear.
Similarly, NTSB's May 4th '95 denial-letter cited newly fabricated "facts" about the yawing motion recorded by FDR-Hdg trace. Shown below are the newly fabricated facts cited in the NTSB's May 4th '95 denial letter, fabrications that clearly were NOT documented by the original investigators in April 1979.
appears only on a website unaffiliated with NTSB,
this letter exists ONLY in html- format on that website;
NTSB's entrenched managers defined their 1995- letter as
"Response to Petition for Reconsideration".
In their letter to the court,
NTSB finally disclosed the history of
various petitions filed against AAR-81-8, and
the date each Petition was received by NTSB.
Furthermore NTSB erroneously told the court that
NTSB would handle EACH petition, separately.
Inside the USA's "independent" NTSB
freed from any outside intervention
and freed from investigative "safeguards" :
The NTSB's own Staff-Managers?
Loss of hydraulic fluid,
Forced into action, by these legal proceedings against USA's NTSB,
on May 4, 1995 the NTSB did finally react to the court-proceedings:
NTSB issued their mysterious letter -- that denied Gibson's Petition to Reconsider
(in the interim of the court proceedings).
Rather than an engineering-side response to a technical Petition,
the NTSB-letter of May 4th '95 appears instead to be
a veiled effort by NTSB's legal-side,
Office of the General Counsel, to evade any court-action.
That court found his second request, the first appeal, to be moot,
because the NTSB had acted -- had finally created
their long-delayed May 4th "denial" decision in the interim.