Failure - Interactions

McAdams:

I do not agree

Infusing moral values

into science  . . . 

Elwood Driver

May  '79 

Investigator- Err  & NTSB's RETRACTION

Disgust  Manipulation

   "in  its  own  sad,   irreversible  fashion,

        every  disaster  contributes . . .  knowledge;

              every disaster teaches us  . . .    You follow me?"

 Immediately following this NTSB final "Sunshine Meeting", 
 the NTSB Investigator-in-Charge, "Dean" Kampschror,
 approached the ALPA-Coordinator; 
 the NTSB's  IIC  offered this final "consoling remark":

"You put up a tough fight, 
 but
​ we couldn't let you 
 fault the world's ​most used airplane
 at this time."  

 [Exhibit,  . . . . Gibson Attorneys' Petition, dated May 2 1991.]

       FDR's  Stylus-on-creeping-Foil    G-trace    Magnified 200x

data-dredging  :   selection bias  :    voodoo   correlation

   The  Lessons  learned   from  

      NTSB's   Organizational- Disaster   of

                           1979 to June 1981:

  as   George Van Epps   said,

         after the AA-Flight One Investigation

?  Perjurers ?

   Left unsaid:

                        The three pilots    

                                  aboard the accident-aircraft

                         were perjurers.

If the mishap pilots  had   manipulated  the flap / slat controls

           (as purported in The Boeing Scenario),

  then  USA-NTSB  had  finally judged those mishap-pilots   of

                 also  having  committed  perjury:  

 --  in denying  the accusation  during deposition

       at Inglewood CA on 12Apr79,  Captain's transcript  pg 46-47, 

              answering   the direct  question   from Fred Rathke;  

 --  additionally  in the NTSB-docket is an  affidavit (dated Nov29, 1979)

       again describing   the Captains account  explicitly stating that

          there had been no deployment of flap/slats prior to the upset-dive.

The  NTSB's   choice of   "facts"   about the initial upset :  

    Whatever fit   with    The Boeing Scenario

          (NTSB selectively accepted or rejected   direct  evidence).

    . . .  Boeing  . . .

          no  way

        that  it could have  happened

            the way   the pilots    said  . . .

Seattle Times,    June 10th,  1981,     pg  A10. 

  AAR-81-8    was   signed   by  only  three   Board Members,

               but one of those had   disagreed  with the   process  &  Conclusions.

8

The Plane that Fell From the Sky

Buzz Bissinger's award winning  special feature appeared two weeks earlier  in the St. Paul Pioneer Press  (a local story since most of the passengers  lived in Minnesota).

The web offers two of the sections  from  that long  print-feature, "The Plane that Fell From the Sky":

    One pdf covers  "The Flight" (pdf 843 Kb) ,

      another pdf covers "The Investigation" (pdf 2Mb) ,

            and is available also as images in a slideshow.

Later, in July'83,  CBS-TV's 

                CBS Reports    used that same title.

    NTSB's  AAR 81-8,   page  33,  

                                ending the analysis section: 

   This   condemnation   paragraph,   

        reflected their   investigative-bias,

              &  erroneous- assumptions  about  the  Extension of #7-Slat,

                     &  their  assumed method  for   degaussing  of  CVR-Mag-Tape.

         June 9th,  1981   Sunshine Act  Meeting  

an   Organizational- Disaster

    two  of the NTSB   "Board Members"    vote to

                        adopt   the Boeing Scenario    as  P.C.

Lesson for  Board Members    and   staff  managers

NTSB still has  no    organizational  protections against  "Scientific Misconduct" --   

No  Inspector General, 

no Scientific Ombudsman,  

no  outside  oversight of   USA's  "independent"  Safety Board.