Failure - Interactions

AAR-81-8, Section 1.16.4, "Flight Tests":

page  12,   page 13,  page 14.

Contrast  the manufacturer's  

 post-test assumption                    

against  the NTSB's "fact"         

used to explain that   data dissimilarity.


For better review of the test-data, see

Petition pages  17,   18,   19,  20,   21,  22,  


Similar traces --   FDR   HEADING

during   INITIAL   upset:

WAL  Boeing 720  N3166  31March 1971


 TWA 841   N840TW  4April 1979

Confirmation bias

The tendency to  search for   or interpret information   in a way that confirms one's preconceptions. . . .   discredit information  that does not support  their views. . . . 

 Pdf –best 6.6MB

 Pdf   quicker 1.1MB

The  NTSB's   Investigator-in-Charge  

persisted with his   one-sidedness:

   ". . . a head-on  collision  between

the credibility of the  crew 

versus  the . . .  aircraft."


Two-weeks  after this feature story appeared in print,     on June 9th, 1981, 

the USA's  "independent"  Safety Board 

adopted  The Boeing Scenario 

as their   official  P.C.          


        The Plane that Fell from the Sky

  Published in the   Saint Paul Pioneer Press

    on May 24th,  1981 

         --  appearing  just two weeks before

               the final  NTSB  Board-Meeting  on June 9th.

  Despite  reassurances  from the NTSB  that their  long  investigation  wasn't  "fixed",

     the pilots  felt otherwise  about  the  USA's   officially   "independent"  Safety Board.

   This  long feature story was  published in a special section, 
          researched and written    by Buzz Bissinger:  it  won   the  Livingston Award.  

   One section of   that  feature was titled  "The Investigation" --  
           and included  insights   and comments from   dozens of insiders, 
                 offering the most detailed review  of the  controversial,
                           and long,     NTSB  accident   INVESTIGATION:

   One man,    the IIC,

     became the

  sole arbiter of

  unwarranted assumptions 

   presented to the Board; 

 the sole arbiter of  any "evidence"  retained  in the official NTSB  "docket".


     NTSB's  bias --   The Boeing Scenario       

                    affected  their managers'

                                      choice of "evidence".

  this  early  unconscious  bias 

        tainted each phase of the  investigation.

  The manufacturer stacked-the-deck:  

                   NTSB staff   were  not  sufficiently seasoned 

                                                           to call-out  against the cards-dealt,

                                and  too  awed to  reject  the erroneous   Boeing Scenario.

   Masses of data,     from "simulator trials"  and from an Oct'80  Flight Test, 

           with  selective data-dredging   by Boeing engineers,

                  swamped the Safety Board's  struggling staff-engineers:   

    Staff investigators thus   looked-past    the direct evidence 

            (Wreckage Examination,  Trail of Debris,  pilots' testimony,  mishap-FDR-data),

                    instead  glorifying   data  fabricated  after the accident  

                                                                         at  manufacturer's  facilities.

. . .



   on TWA841

   NTSB managers  omitted

   a "Public Hearing"

  Historic Failure-Interactions  never considered  

       Alpa  prompted   NTSB investigators

                               to refocus  --  citing direct evidence

   Below is an excerpt from the ALPA Submission  (analysis per  §831.14),

                         requested  by NTSB   prior to the second Sunshine Act Meeting of the Board.

  NTSB- managers'   Investigative mistakes: 

         Safety Board  Refused to pursue

                          historic  failure interactions

  gaps left by  NTSB's

selective investigation


    NTSB's   IIC,   to Boeing's Prater Hogue,     Cited    the  Similarity   of

FDR-Heading  traces   during   Yaw x Roll   upset

-- But the  IIC   misconstrued   the   lesson

        about the WAL  B720  Yaw x Roll = DIVE,

           a prior case of Discrepant Rudder,  as  instead

                  possible  supporting evidence  for   their 

                          erroneous  hypothesis   (The Boeing Scenario)

                             which proposed  an  EXTENDED  #7-Slat   as cause of

                                   INITIAL upset   of B727  N840TW.

Glines' story -- Continued --  from pg 7,  of  the Nov' 1981  issue

Boeing's     Oct' 1980   Flight Test

       Manufacturer's  data-dredging

 selection bias    voodoo  correlations   

              --   A bloomin'  buzzin'  confusion   

                           aimed at  NTSB staff

  Another  notice  sent  to the NTSB chairman:

  Oct'9th, 1980 -- Letter  to NTSB Chairman James King,

             from Capt. McIntyre (ALPA party coordinator) relating

            confrontation with IIC Kampschror at the

                    Boeing Meeting  in Seattle for the flight test. 

                               [The IIC later excluded this letter from the NTSB's docket.]

Petition pg-108
Oct' 1990 alpa-Petition against NTSB AAR 81-8
full-video CBS Reports
Witkin TV-review NYTimes
pg-by-pg Air Line Pilot Oct 1981

Lessons from the Boeing-led  


  Night    FL390    CRZ     Yaw x Roll = DIVE

B727   N840TW,     TWA 841   4Apr'79