After Yorke's refutation of NTSB-AAR-81-8 [ The Boeing Scenario ] ,
those three Petitions for Reconsideration
had been accepted by NTSB in 1990 and 1991.
"... a few talented pilots, engineers, and aircraft accident investigators . . .
their refusal to cynically accept the corruption of their craft . . ."
". . . do we need a public agency like the NTSB . . . ?"
violating their Rules of Practice §845.41(b),
ignoring NTSB's MIM 4.15 --
In early 1995, facing that court challenge,
legal (court) petition for Mandamus dated January 13th, 1995,
NTSB staff-managers finally responded only
to the Attorneys' ntsb- petition [2May1991].
NTSB staff-managers conveniently ignored the more detailed "alpa" Petition,
acknowledged by NTSB as
"received" in October 1990.
NTSB staff- managers erroneously told the court that the two
other petitions-cited would be
"handled independent of
the subject petition from Captain Gibson. . . ."
NTSB staff-managers have NEVER acknowledged their errs in AAR-81-8 :
no errata-sheets, no revision, NO retraction.
Then after years of NTSB refusal to respond, attorney's submitted it to courts for legal intervention.
This Petition served as:
--- an §845.41-Petition for Reconsideration,
directed at USA's NTSB AAR-81-8;
--- and as the source document for
court action against NTSB's persistent negligence.
This Petition (dated 2May91), collated by attorneys,
differs from other petitions:
This includes records from post-accident court trials. It offers testimony from Boeing engineers who created the written draft of The Boeing Scenario. And this petition offers testimony from the NTSB's Investigator-in-Charge (IIC) "Dean" Kampschror.
In addition, this petition offers a
forthright account of NTSB's investigative biases, mistakes.
Investigators (instructors and students) can learn from NTSB mistakes.
This petition includes a nice essay about
"the corruption of the craft" of mishap-investigation, and
the professional outrage against NTSB corruption.
John … handed Ron Schleede a copy of the Petition.
After flipping through the document and appearing indifferent to its contents,
Schleede set the petition down on his desk.
[Schleede] said something about being very busy and not having much time to look at it."
1990 --> 1991 --> 1992 --> 1993 --> 1994
NTSB staff buried the Petitions
against their AAR-81-8
In Oct' 1990, John Rohlfing (from TWA-alpa)
HAND-CARRIED that "alpa" Petition around
to NTSB- Board Members, AND
to NTSB's staff-manager Ron Schleede.
Tuesday, October 29th, 1996 B737 ground-test,
at the Boeing Flight Test Center (BFI)
Jim McRoberts discovered a flaw
in the ship's Rudder Control System.
December 19, 1997 SilkAir MI185 B737
CRZ inflight upset, dive, inflight breakup.
-- NTSB's 11Dec2000 arguments against the Indonesian AAR,
asserting instead Boeing's claims that
as AAR Appendix N, signed by Chairman Jim Hall.
March 24, 1999 NTSB-AAR-99-01,
final report on B737 accident of 8Sep94
also included NTSB's implicit retraction of the AAR-92-06.
March 27, 2001 NTSB-AAR-01/01,
"amended" the earlier AAR-92-06;
AAR-01/01 P.C. = "... rudder surface ... deflected
... direction opposite ..."
". . . On December 2, 1991, Trans World Airlines, Inc., filed a petition . . .
TWA’s stated purpose of the petition was to
'finally put to rest the questions-raised in the petition of Captain Gibson...'
The TWA petition is also being handled independent of
the subject petition from Captain Gibson. . . ."
[NTSB acknowledged the Petition from the airline, May 4, 1995]
Yaw x Roll = DIVE !
was formally presented to NTSB.
The Air Line Pilots Association, Accident Investigation Department,
led by Harold Marthinsen, sent copies of that "alpa" Petition
to its pilot-investigators, offering Yorke's powerful insights
about "discrepant Rudder" upsets;
sourcing the obvious effect (roll) to Beta (cause)
explaining the slice into a steep dive event
without any A.N.D. pitch-moment.
Before the B737 upset at Colorado Springs,
upset-DIVE-impact near Colorado Springs:
-- the early mountain-rotor theory, Boeing's simulations;
-- the 16July92 Rudder-Pedal delay at ORD;
-- NTSB's 4Aug92 reprimand (after a Rudder theory);
-- Boeing's 8Oct92 meeting, "we have a problem";
-- NTSB AAR-92-06, dated 8Dec92 (with no Public Hearing)
May 28, 1991 Lauda B767 violent inflight upset,
inflight breakup, Thailand.
Reporting on the criticism by
in late June 1961,
"... proposal ... allows CAB
members to delegate so
much power to subordinates that
persons dealing with the board
may be denied 'substantive rights'....
it is neither desirable
nor in the public interest
to permit such functions to be
delegated to subordinates . . .
"On October 9, 1990, ALPA submitted . . . Petition . . . consists of 116 pages and claims . . .
all parties . . . erroneously assumed
that the No. 7 leading edge slat . . . was
the initiating cause of the accident. . . .
The response to the ALPA petition is
being handled separately
in a manner independent of the subject
petition from Captain Gibson. . . ."
[On May 4, 1995, NTSB finally acknowledged receipt of this petition,
confirming that years earlier
NTSB staff had buried this Petition.]
NTSB never responded to this "alpa" Petition from Oct' 1990.
"… October … 1990 . . .
ALPA’s ... Petition for Reconsideration
was ready for submission.
John Rohlfing … was eager to present the Petition to the NTSB....
he flew to Washington D.C., to hand deliver it…..
he had several copies of the petition with him …
… arrived in Washington. He told the secretary who … and why they were there.
The men were then escorted into the offices of Ron Schleede,
the Chief of Major Aviation Investigations at the NTSB.
Yaw x Roll = DIVE !
Refresh your awareness of events
forcing NTSB's investigative- mistakes,
during the spring and summer of 1979
[to appreciate the stress on NTSB-managers].
On June 6th, 1979
FAA "grounded" the DC-10 ,
and NTSB made a deal
to solve their lingering B-727 mystery.
= = =
Carefully fit together the upset lessons of the 1990's:
with the recurring rush-to-judgement ,
misleading NTSB-staff managers .
The mind-set of NTSB staff-managers' evolved:
Lacking any training in the historic
NTSB favored Boeing's "analysis" and "simulation"
concluding mountain-rotor or,
For most of the 1990's NTSB
rejected any suggestion of "discrepant rudder"
as a possible source of a sudden rolling-moment.
- - -
Failure - Interactions
After years of NTSB non-compliance with their own rules
on handling Petitions for Reconsideration,
the mishap-pilot elected to PAY for outside legal intervention,
into the NTSB's hidden process,
hoping to correct errs in NTSB AAR-81-8.
On January 13th, 1995, the pilot's attorneys filed legal action against USA's "independent" Safety Board.
“Rohlfing was incredulous….
[Ron Schleede] ... whose job it was to
make sure that accident investigations
were competent and fair …
was ready to discard … years of hard work
without looking at it….
from Captain John Rohlfing's recollections,
of NTSB-staff's response,
to the initial "alpa" Petition for Reconsideration,
detailing Yorke's refutation of The Boeing Scenario .
[Corsetti, Scapegoat, pg. 318, 335, 336.]