Inside   the USA's    "independent"     NTSB

             (freed from  outside intervention   and    freed from   investigative   "safeguards") :

Who  will call-out  that   Scientific Misconduct   violation?

 The  NTSB's own  Staff-Managers?      

False statement

   from  NTSB to Court  

On-scene investigators,  in April'79,

documented  that HYDRAULIC  FLUID  from

the  MAIN hydraulic rupture

 nearest   the RHS-MLG:

see photos excluded from

NTSB's  Public Docket.

The NTSB's  newest    "Quality of Information"   upgrade    is laced with contradictions:


V.   Administrative Mechanism to Correct Disseminated Information


The various   contradictions     [eg, NTSB's  unworkable 845.41(a)],

        hidden as   "exceptions"     to that  added  Quality- "mechanism"

                immediately  yielded  that new  "mechanism"

                      just  as hopeless   and  as  ineffective   as  the original  "safeguard"  -- 845.41(a).

"It is   unclear    what    the  NTSB

has been doing with their records . . ."    

 National Archives,   Chief Records Officer:   

Oversight ... Inspection Report,   

December 19, 2014;    Executive Summary  pg-i    [pdf-3].   

USA's   fight  against    "scientific misconduct",   by  federal agency staff-managers,   

         is detailed in   OSTP's    Scientific  Integrity    initiatives.


       The   USA's   NTSB   is  not  listed  among  agencies    compliant  with  OSTP's  guidelines. 


                         After   delays,  without  any  corrective  action  from NTSB

    Legal proceedings in court:    motivating NTSB  response

 

-- Petition in the Nature of Mandamus   filed   January 13, 1995:

Gibson's  attorneys    sought judicial relief in this matter.    He petitioned the the  Court  to compel the NTSB to act on his   Petition to Reconsider  (the Petition dated 2May'91).    That court denied Gibson's  first request.    Then his attorneys  filed a  timely appeal with Court of Appeals  for the District of Columbia. 


Forced into action, by these legal proceedings against USA's NTSB,  on May 4, 1995   the    NTSB   did  finally react to the court-proceedings:   NTSB  issued their mysterious letter --  that  denied Gibson's  Petition to Reconsider  (in the interim of the court proceedings).  [Rather than an engineering-side response to a  technical Petition,  the  NTSB-letter of May 4th '95 appears instead to be a veiled effort  by NTSB's legal-side,    Office of the General Counsel,    to evade  any court-action.]     


That court found   his second request, the first appeal,  to be moot,  because the NTSB had  acted -- had finally  issued their long-delayed  May 4th "denial"  decision   in the interim. 


  Attorneys then asked   that the  9th Circuit Court of Appeals   review  the NTSB's   May 4th '95  denial of Gibson's Petition,   pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1153(b):

 Argued and Submitted November 5, 1996.            


     United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, decided July 7, 1997,


The NTSB regulations . . .  the NTSB's complete discretion

        to conduct its investigations as it sees fit.

              The denial of Gibson's petition falls within that unreviewable discretion.  


     


   

---   Fabricated   "facts"   cited in the  NTSB's  forced response --   

 

   The  "alpa" Petition of October 9th, 1990  [the first to explain  Yorke's analysis]  had cited numerous  errs   in the NTSB AAR-81-8  (damaged aircraft components mislabeled or misidentified),  errs  which might have contributed to the inability  of NTSB-staff  investigators to correlate the direct evidence;   errs which further confused the documentation in such a way that the pilot-investigators had been provided with wrong wreckage-damage, wrong information about items in the Trail of Debris.

 

Closer examination of that NTSB-denial  letter dated May 4th'95, quickly  revealed "errs" that were beyond the  technical "errata"  found in AAR-81-8:    The foundation  for the NTSB's  May 4th '95 denial-letter,    denying  "reconsideration" for the  Captain Gibson Petition (dated 2May91),    was their newly fabricated  "facts"  about the direct evidence: That  direct evidence  was first examined  during  on-scene  documentation of  "wreckage"  (the damaged aircraft parked on taxiway at DTW).    The Systems Group had documented a main  leakage of hydraulic fluid, from the torn hydraulic- lines near the damaged RHS- Main Landing Gear.  


  Similarly,  the May 4th '95 denial-letter    cited  newly fabricated "facts"   about  the yawing  motion recorded by FDR-Hdg trace.    Shown below are the newly fabricated facts cited in the NTSB's May 4th '95 denial letter,   fabrications that clearly were NOT documented by the original investigators in April 1979.


Correcting  the    Scientific  Record

 Standards  for    RETRACTION    after  publication:  

dealing   with   Investigator-Err,   Scientific Misconduct          

"Retractions  have

always been difficult

to handle,

yet properly used   are

an   essential part  of

correcting

the   scientific  record.


"Confusion often occurs about whether,  and when,

it is appropriate to issue

a full or  partial

  retraction,    

or  an

     expression of concern ..."

Cite  this case,   ID,    or    click-copy   the  image below:  

                 RETRACTION     or      Expression-of-Concern

Since the NTSB refused to comply  with  their   MIM   &  §845.41:

    "under certain circumstances"    correction-retraction   by   "other responsible  persons"  

         is  a step  to   recognition-acknowledgement    of   such  published   investigator-err,  and   scientific misconduct.

The   NTSB-staff  has  consistently   blocked  all efforts to  revise AAR-81-8.    

    Over decades communications to the "Board Members"  were  diverted to staff.


Without some outside intervention,    

           NTSB  AAR 81-8  will never be  revised,  nor retracted.          


Though the NTSB  has no  effective  oversight,  

       perhaps   an   appropriate  Subcommittee,    in   USA's  Congress, 

                   might persuade  NTSB Board Members  toward  

       RETRACTION  of AAR-81-8,     amended law,    future IG-oversight,     Review Board.


In past,    congressional  committee-staff  prepared such suggestions:


Senate:        Subcommittee on  Aviation, Operations, and Security

                         512 Dirksen Senate Building;    Washington DC, 20510


House:          Subcommittee on Aviation

                             2251 Rayburn House Office Building;  Washington, DC 20515

“Properly conducted

        misconduct  investigations

should be seen   as   a badge of honour,

not something you’re embarrassed about. . . .

However that’s not always how the public perceives it,   or the way it’s written up . . .

Institutions may also worry    that their definitions of   misconduct and … investigation  

differ from those of other institutions . . . “


“I think  it’s completely improbable …   to say

   we have had no cases.

It’s  just  not  credible”.                           


Elizabeth Wager. . .  member of UKRIO’s advisory board.
Nature  521, 271(21 May 2015)
    doi:10.1038/nature.2015.17559


The USA's  

Broken  Investigation   Safeguards



   The  "Board Members"   have   in some cases   

            proved  powerless  to  acknowledge  and

                    prevent    Investigator - misconduct;


    The NTSB  rule  845.41  on  Petitions

                                                           is   unworkable:   


        --   NTSB-staff holds a functional  VETO  

                 over  any  petition  submitted  

                     (Eg,  staff-manager's  bureaucratic-burial of

                             the   Oct'1990  petition  against  AAR-81-8

                                that first detailed  Yorke's  refutation  of  

                                           the Boeing Scenario);

 

       --   NTSB-staff  or Counsel  submitted

              to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals

                that document dated 4May95,

                   signed by three  Board Members,

                     that included the falsified "facts";


       --  NTSB  failed to include in

                 the Public Docket those Petitions

                         against AAR-81-8  (violated §845.50);

,  


        --   NTSB   failed to follow their own

                   Safeguards  (_MIM_  4.15  and Appdx q)  

                      meant for  processing  Petitions

                        against   mistakes in  an  AAR.


.

Investigative   Safeguards

   

    US Code  Title 49 

   

      Special Boards of Inquiry -- But only if invited by NTSB:




   (a)   Establishment.-- If an accident involves a substantial question about public safety in air transportation,

        the National Transportation Safety Board may establish a special board of inquiry composed of--


          (1)   one member of the Board acting as chairman; and


           (2)    2 members representing the public, appointed by the President on notification of the establishment of the special board of inquiry.

   

     (b)   Qualifications and conflicts of interest.--The public members of a special board of inquiry must be qualified by training and experience to  

               participate in the inquiry and may not have a pecuniary interest in an aviation enterprise involved in the accident to be investigated.


     (c)   Authority.--A special board of inquiry has the same authority that the Board has under this chapter.


   .   .    .   



   Acknowledging   bias: 
              one  USA  mishap investigation 

                         was    transferred   to TSB / canada:

 

        ERA12RA367A   . . .   collided in flight in the vicinity of Sumerduck, Virginia. . . .  Under the provisions of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and by mutual agreement,   the United States delegated the accident investigation to the government of Canada.   The NTSB designated an accredited representative to the investigation on behalf of the United States, and the FAA designated an advisor to the accredited representative.

The investigation was conducted by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada under its statutes.   


A review of this  investigation,  delegated   to a different country's  "investigating authority",  was presented by  Jon Lee,  at ISASI's  Vancouver gathering in 2013:

       Delegating Full Investigative Authority to a Foreign Agency


  "... a few talented pilots,  engineers,   and aircraft accident investigators . . . 

                  their refusal to cynically accept the corruption of their craft . . ."
   ". . . do we need a public agency like the NTSB . . .
?"

    Yet NTSB's denial-letter  of May 4th '95  stated 

       "NO YAWING moments  identifiable  on the FDR."


 

Passengers  sensed  a  YAW- motion

during the INITIAL  upset.  

  excerpts from the Human Factors Report   

 


 The  mysterious   4May95-  NTSB   "letter"

  - -   A forced response  offered to  Courts


This May 4th '95  letter   from NTSB,    effectively blocked   all  Petitions filed against AAR-81-8  (three Petitions filed after  Yorke's analysis  had  finally refuted the Boeing Scenario).   Because of   legal-logic   in that     appeals court decision:  

that undisclosed  NTSB   "response"    is forever   "unreviewable"    [protected  in  law].


That  document,   the NTSB's  denial-response,   had remained  unknown to other investigators.    The engineer-investigators  were unaware that the legal-side of the NTSB had responded  (on May 4th '95)  to one  of the Petitions against  AAR-81-8:

  none of the   investigators   from  the various parties                         

               had ever heard about  any NTSB response   to the various Petitions.    


The earliest NTSB website  had  listed  NTSB responses to  Petitions of Reconsideration -- but nothing was ever openly disclosed about any NTSB response to any of the 1990's petitions against AAR-81-8.   Similarly, during the mid-'90's,   NTSB employees had copies of  a LIST of  those  petitions  that required further attention,  and a future response.   The Petitions against   AAR-81-8 were then  listed as still open,  pending future actions by NTSB-staff.

 

Currently,  NTSB  does not disclose    any  compilation (listing) of  its  responses to petitions,  nor any list of still-open  Petitions.  NTSB has so far refused to openly verify that any May 4th '95- response was actually created by NTSB;  the NTSB's 2014  FOIA response revealed staff's open neglect of law.      The only acknowledgement of  that  May 4th '95 NTSB- response- letter  was that item cited in a court decision --  nothing from NTSB to acknowledge that any May 4th'95 response existed.    There is no oversight of the  USA's "independent" Safety Board:  No Scientific Ombudsman, no IG, no  Congressional committee permitted to intervene;  the  political appointed  Board Members  have refused to insure that NTSB rule 845.41  (Petitions)  operates as intended.  

More explicitly,   that undisclosed    NTSB   "response"    began  their  final  "cover-up".

      xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx​​

  Dated May 4th, 1995   an  NTSB letter,     


            (receipt acknowledged only by

                                    US   9th Circuit   Court of Appeals)


This  mysterious document,  from NTSB  (appears only on a website unaffiliated with NTSB), so far that letter exists ONLY in html- format on that website;  the letter is labeled "Response to Petition for Reconsideration".     In their letter to the court,  NTSB cites  the history of various petitions filed against AAR-81-8,  and   NTSB acknowledged  the date   each  Petition was received   by NTSB.   Furthermore  NTSB    erroneously    told the court  that

NTSB  would handle  EACH  petition,  separately:

   A Public Inquiry - -

 Final Report, Commission of Inquiry into the Air Ontario Crash at Dryden, Ontario,   Preface, pg xxii:
... . . . "... reinforced my strong belief  in the value of a public Inquiry under the Inquiries Act. 

As a  means of conducting an investigation . . . such an Inquiry under
. . . . . . the Inquiries Act has the great advantages of
. . . . . .. . ..virtually unlimited power to subpoena witnesses and 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the testing of their evidence in the crucible of cross-examination.  

I am convinced that, as an instrument in the search for truth, a public Inquiry, judiciously and fairly conducted has no peer. . . .    my intention that the concept of procedural fairness would be the basic tenet of this Inquiry . . .
​ . . .  In the course of any commission of inquiry,
. . . . . . . . allegations will be made at public hearings 
. . . . . . . . . . . .which will reflect adversely on certain parties.   

​It is my position that any party adversely implicated
. . . . by testimony at the public hearings of the Commission
. . . . . . . . shall be given a full opportunity to be heard."


USA's  NTSB  is free of  any court  Review

---  USA's NTSB has  Unreviewable Discretion ---

  A Commission of Inquiry

 Justice Virgil P. Moshansky


. . .   Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB) investigators were at the accident site

within hours of the Dryden crash.                           

 However,   intense public controversy raged​ . . .     


The CASB Dryden inquiry . . .  was halted by

the Minister of Transport,  who opted for

a   public  inquiry. . . .

 the Government of Canada,

facing   mounting  public criticism . . .

 replaced  the CASB   with  

a  Commission of Inquiry   under the   Inquiries Act

 to investigate the Dryden accident. . . .  


The CASB Chief Investigator   and  most of his team  

were seconded to the Commission  . . .  


 Using  a Commission   in this way is rare   and

was done  to restore credibility  to                    

the aviation accident investigative process  . . . 

 

. . .  Credible investigation must be independent and dignified  (without appearing elitist),   transparent  and without constraint.   Most importantly,  it must be perceived by the public as free from vested influence.  


Effectiveness of the Judiciary


  It can be argued that  the judiciary  is uniquely positioned to resolve these issues.    

A Commission of Inquiry   under the  Inquiries Act,

       unlike an investigative body such as

            CASB   or ...  TSB      

  vests in Commissioners:​

  - -  All the powers of a superior court judge;

  - -   Freedom and independence from

            political or governmental influence . . .

... 


Petition of Captain H.G. Gibson 


  Filed  May 2nd '91  by three attorneys, 

                                      against NTSB's AAR-81-8. 


This Petition served as: 

  ---  an 845.41-Petition for Reconsideration

                            directed at USA's NTSB AAR-81-8;

  ---  and as  the source document for

                            court action against NTSB's persistent negligence.


This Petition (dated 2May91), collated by attorneys,   differs from other petitions: 

This includes records from post-accident court trials.   It offers testimony from Boeing engineers who created the written draft of The Boeing Scenario.   And this petition offers testimony from the NTSB's Investigator-in-Charge (IIC)  "Dean" Kampschror.  


In addition, this petition offers a  forthright   account of NTSB's investigative biases,  mistakes.  Investigators (instructors and students) can learn from these mistakes.  

 This petition includes a nice essay about   "the corruption of the craft"    of mishap-investigation, and the  professional outrage against that corruption.  



FDR- Heading

  Scientific  Misconduct

Outright scientific- FRAUD



   Captain's  testimony describing the INITIAL upset

         ". . . it did go off to the right . . .   maybe 10-degrees

                 off to the right . . . before it rolled."

 

Failure - Interactions

Dec'2015  NTSB  Rule CHANGE:  

      further  confuses  the  "Board of Inquiry"  concept,  muddling  the above  law  with the NTSB's new   Rules of Practice § 845.5

Parallel  INVESTIGATIONS,   to  contrast   against  USA's   investigation of   TWA841 / 4Apr79:
NZ's   Commission of Inquiry,   Air New Zealand  DC-10     TE901 /  28Nov79
Chippendale's Report  versus    the Mahon Report.

"On October 9, 1990,   ALPA submitted . . .  Petition  . . .  consists of 116 pages and claims . . . all  parties  . . .  erroneously assumed that the No. 7 leading edge slat  . . .  was the initiating cause of the accident. . . .  The response to the ALPA petition is being handled separately in a manner independent of    the subject    petition from Captain Gibson. . . ."

" . . . Captain H. G. Gibson   Petition for Reconsideration . . .   the May 2, 1991 Petition . . .   Based on its review of the petition and the facts derived during the course of the investigation and subsequent reviews, the National Transportation   Safety Board denies the petition in its entirety.

 ". . .   On December 2, 1991, Trans World Airlines, Inc., filed a petition . . . TWA’s stated purpose of the petition was to 'finally put to rest the questions -raised in the petition of Captain Gibson...'   The TWA petition is also being handled independent of the subject petition from Captain Gibson. . . ." 

US National Academies aims to     shift  thinking  about   scientific  misconduct    

      away from corrupt individuals . . .   toward researchers   working  within  a  flawed  system . . . 


The National Academies committee is considering  expanding the definition  of research misconduct,

           and taking into account the responsibilities of  . . . institutions, . . . and  professional societies. . . .


[From an  AAAS session  on   13 February 2015,  

         the National Academies'  committee report   is now available, released June 2015.]


2017 National Academies release :   ... Integrity ... ,   284-pgs,   pdf


US  chemical  safety  board  in   turmoil,  

ChemistryWorld,    10 March 2015 

". . .  Board Member ...  Ehrlich said CSB’s problems have largely been due to the

     ‘confused and ambiguous lines of authority’

                   between the chairman,   board members   and   other staff."




Testimony  on March 4th, 2015:  details  IG-oversight   of  CSB, 

Rebuilding the Chemical Safety Board:

Finding a Solution to the CSB’s Governance and Management Challenges


Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
2157 Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, DC 20515
Phone:    (202) 225-5074

    Fax:    (202) 225-3974

... Kampschror denied this...

but under cross-examination ... the Boeing expert ... admitted that    on  June 6, 1979   ...

 NTSB's Kampschror  

 asked  Boeing  to propose ...   description  of   what had happened.

January 1995 --  Pilot  seeks Court Action   against USA-NTSB:

                                              Seattle Times,               Post-Gazette

10

 

   Err recognition? -- Learning from mistakes?  -- inside NTSB:


   The Safety Board was provided

                with "Petitions" documenting Investigator- mistakes;


   The NTSB- Rule 845.41 "process" has proven unworkable;


   The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals  reaffirmed  that

          USA's   "independent"    Safety Board   has

                   no permissible methods of oversight by congress,

                            nor by any "IG",  nor by any court. 

Revision,  24Dec2015:  The old 845.41 has been REVISED, renumbered to 845.32            

NTSB's   May 4th '95  denial-letter  

                       cited newly fabricated "facts"

-- the basis for their  denial

                           was these   fraudulent  "Facts"

Fabricated Fact

Contradicts

the Systems Grp Rpt

Fabricated "fact"

Contradicts

the FDR-data

  Systems Group

    Factual Rpt

   Loss of hydraulic fluid,

              location.

...

Pg 7 Attorney-Petition 2May91

 

NTSB's  Fabricated "facts"

 Yawing motion was recorded on FDR,  and  observed by the pilot,  and felt by the passengers.