USA's   fight  against    "scientific misconduct",   by  federal agency staff-managers,   

         is detailed in   OSTP's    Scientific  Integrity    initiatives.

       The   USA's   NTSB   is  not  listed  among  agencies    compliant  with  OSTP's  guidelines. 

   Acknowledging   bias: 
              one  USA  mishap investigation 

                         was    transferred   to TSB / canada:


        ERA12RA367A   . . .   collided in flight in the vicinity of Sumerduck, Virginia. . . .  Under the provisions of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and by mutual agreement,   the United States delegated the accident investigation to the government of Canada.   The NTSB designated an accredited representative to the investigation on behalf of the United States, and the FAA designated an advisor to the accredited representative.

The investigation was conducted by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada under its statutes.   

A review of this  investigation,  delegated   to a different country's  "investigating authority",  was presented by  Jon Lee,  at ISASI's  Vancouver gathering in 2013:

       Delegating Full Investigative Authority to a Foreign Agency

Note   that   distinction:

     the  weakness  in  law,   § 1153

 created a government agency,

but      no method   to review

       that  agency's   mistakes.

The   court's decision  offered

     no opinion

 on  the erroneous assumptions of

      The Boeing Scenario,

  nor  on  NTSB's   erroneous "facts".

J'Accuse -- Emile Zola's fight against investigator-err

The   NTSB-staff  has  consistently   blocked  all efforts to  revise AAR-81-8.    

    Over decades communications to the "Board Members"  were  diverted to staff.

Without some outside intervention,    

           NTSB  AAR 81-8  will never be  revised,  nor retracted.          

Though the NTSB  has no  effective  oversight,  

       perhaps   an   appropriate  Subcommittee,    in   USA's  Congress, 

                   might persuade  NTSB Board Members  toward  

                        RETRACTION  of AAR-81-8,

                            amended law,      future IG-oversight,       Review Board.

In past,    congressional  committee-staff  prepared such suggestions:

Senate:        Subcommittee on  Aviation, Operations, and Security

                         512 Dirksen Senate Building;    Washington DC, 20510

House:          Subcommittee on Aviation

                             2251 Rayburn House Office Building;  Washington, DC 20515


    US Code  Title 49 


      Special Boards of Inquiry -- But only if invited by NTSB:

  •        § 1112.   Special boards of inquiry   on air transportation safety

   (a)   Establishment.-- If an accident involves a substantial question about public safety in air transportation,

        the National Transportation Safety Board may establish a special board of inquiry composed of--

          (1)   one member of the Board acting as chairman; and

           (2)    2 members representing the public, appointed by the President on notification of the establishment of the special board of inquiry.


     (b)   Qualifications and conflicts of interest.--The public members of a special board of inquiry must be qualified by training and experience to  

               participate in the inquiry and may not have a pecuniary interest in an aviation enterprise involved in the accident to be investigated.

     (c)   Authority.--A special board of inquiry has the same authority that the Board has under this chapter.

   .   .    .   

Gov'ts routinely cover-up science misdeeds

  NTSB's    AAR-81-8   =   The Boeing Scenario

                 dated    June  9th, 1981

NTSB 2015 -- Most Wanted NTSB's own Procedural-Compliance

July  2019  --   Congressional  efforts 

                                  easing ever closer  to solving  the  problem :

​... Support for   Scientific Integrity . . . 

 ...    a predetermined    plan of deception   at   the Inquiry

         ... an attempt  to conceal

                                  a series of   disastrous   administrative blunders

...   I am   forced reluctantly   to say  that 

                   I had to listen to   an orchestrated  litany of lies

                                                     ... disappearance of documents ... 

1990   ---   1991   ---   1992   ---   1993   ---   1994   ---   1995   

A taboo issue ?
button-link to Home Page

The USA's  

Broken  Investigation   Safeguards

   The  "Board Members"   have   in some cases   

            proved  powerless  to  acknowledge  and

                    prevent    Investigator - misconduct;

    The NTSB  rule  845.41  on  Petitions

                                                           is   unworkable:   

        --   NTSB-staff holds a functional  VETO  

                 over  any  petition  submitted  

                     (Eg,  staff-manager's  bureaucratic-burial of

                             the   Oct'1990  petition  against  AAR-81-8

                                that first detailed  Yorke's  refutation  of  

                                           the Boeing Scenario);


       --   NTSB-staff  or Counsel  submitted

              to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals

                that document dated 4May95,

                   signed by three  Board Members,

                     that included the falsified "facts";

       --  NTSB  failed to include in

                 the Public Docket those Petitions

                         against AAR-81-8  (violated §845.50);


        --   NTSB   failed to follow their own

                   Safeguards  (_MIM_  4.15  and Appdx q)  

                      meant for  processing  Petitions

                        against   mistakes in  an  AAR.


USA's  NTSB  is  freed

From    any   Tech'  Review

  USA's    NTSB,  

staff managers      and      Board Members

have  a    unique    scientific   privilege :

  Unreviewable    Discretion 

US  chemical  safety  board  in   turmoil,  

ChemistryWorld,    10 March 2015 

". . .  Board Member ...  Ehrlich said CSB’s problems have largely been due to the

     ‘confused and ambiguous lines of authority’

                   between the chairman,   board members   and   other staff."

Testimony  on March 4th, 2015:  details  IG-oversight   of  CSB, 

Rebuilding the Chemical Safety Board:

Finding a Solution to the CSB’s Governance and Management Challenges

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
2157 Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, DC 20515
Phone:    (202) 225-5074

    Fax:    (202) 225-3974


   April 4 – Glorify NTSB   

NZ All Blacks -- colors
Hot-link to Section-9 Yorke's Refutation

   A Public Inquiry - -

 Final Report, Commission of Inquiry into the Air Ontario Crash at Dryden, Ontario,   Preface, pg xxii:
... . . . "... reinforced my strong belief  in the value of a public Inquiry under the Inquiries Act. 

As a  means of conducting an investigation . . . such an Inquiry under
. . . . . . the Inquiries Act has the great advantages of
. . . . . .. . ..virtually unlimited power to subpoena witnesses and 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the testing of their evidence in the crucible of cross-examination.  

I am convinced that, as an instrument in the search for truth, a public Inquiry, judiciously and fairly conducted has no peer. . . .    my intention that the concept of procedural fairness would be the basic tenet of this Inquiry . . .
​ . . .  In the course of any commission of inquiry,
. . . . . . . . allegations will be made at public hearings 
. . . . . . . . . . . .which will reflect adversely on certain parties.   

​It is my position that any party adversely implicated
. . . . by testimony at the public hearings of the Commission
. . . . . . . . shall be given a full opportunity to be heard."

Nokia  … a classic example of the perils … for industry leaders. . . .
       underlines how little influence   board members   often have
 when   faced with   an  entrenched management team. . . .
           a  board’s   role   must be 
                                     to   challenge   management
Bosses must have   an attitude of   “paranoid optimism”. . .  
                                                           "Crossed lines  in the boardroom"
                                     The Economist ,  Nov 15th 2018 , Business, Bartleby, 

Parallel  INVESTIGATIONS,   to  contrast   against  USA's   investigation of   TWA841 / 4Apr79:
NZ's   Commission of Inquiry,   Air New Zealand  DC-10     TE901 /  28Nov79
Chippendale's Report  versus    the Mahon Report.


   Err recognition?

                        -- Learning from mistakes?  -- inside NTSB:

   The Safety Board was provided

          with   Petitions    documenting

                                   Investigator- mistakes;

"the corruption of the craft"     

   The NTSB- Rule 845.41 "process"

                        has proven unworkable;

Revision,  24Dec2015:  The old 845.41 has been REVISED, renumbered to 845.32  

The revised §845.32  omitted  the  NTSB's "response"  obligations .        

OSTP's Dec' 2010 Guidelines
Court of Appeals 9th Circuit: ... the NTSB's complete discretion . . . that unreviewable discretion....

Err-recognition,  err-correction,

This  § 1112   "Special Board of Inquiry"  --  in the early  framework for a new NTSB --

                              missed  the   intended function   of

                                    a      Public   Inquiry

               (a missing  investigative safeguard).

      To correct weaknesses,

           § 1112,   §1137,    §1138,  §845.32    need rewrite,  to explicitly include

                                         more detailed    "audits" by  GAO    and

                                                    detailed  tech' reviews  by an IG.

                                            NTSB AAR's  suffer from  this  lack of  quality-control,

                                                           this   lack of   investigative "safeguards".

US National Academies aims to     shift  thinking  about   scientific  misconduct    

      away from corrupt individuals . . .   toward researchers   working  within  a  flawed  system . . . 

The National Academies committee is considering  expanding the definition  of research misconduct,

           and taking into account

             the responsibilities of  . . . institutions, . . . and  professional societies. . . .

[From an  AAAS session  on   13 February 2015,  

         the National Academies'  committee report   is now available, released June 2015.]

2017 National Academies release :   ... Integrity ... ,   284-pgs,   pdf

This  website  will    cease to exist

                                            in a few days.

Why do they deserve protection from the public eye?

        Research cheats are no different from other bad actors . . .

"Retractions  have

always been difficult

to handle,

yet properly used   are

an   essential part  of


the   scientific  record.

"Confusion often occurs about whether,  and when,

it is appropriate to issue

a full or  partial


or  an

     expression of concern ..."

Targeting  repairs   to Laws   for   fixing  NTSB's  future mistakes.

       Meant for   Congressional subcommittees.

 ". . .   On December 2, 1991, Trans World Airlines, Inc., filed a petition . . .  

    Ignoring  the  NTSB-bias, and  erroneous findings,  

            the court  ignored  the  errs,   ignored misconduct,

                          from the  Boeing-NTSB  investigation:

The 1997-decision:

           the  court   lacked  jurisdiction   to hear the  case.

The NTSB's  newest    "Quality of Information"   upgrade    is laced with contradictions:

V.   Administrative Mechanism to Correct Disseminated Information

The various   contradictions     [eg, NTSB's  unworkable 845.41(a)],

        hidden as   "exceptions"     to that  added  Quality- "mechanism"

                immediately  yielded  that new  "mechanism"

                      just  as hopeless   and  as  ineffective   as  the original  "safeguard"  -- 845.41(a).

NTSB's most  recent  NPRM failed to address  the 

       weaknesses  built  into  law,   and  in  their new §845.32 .

Procedural Compliance

  A Commission of Inquiry

 Justice Virgil P. Moshansky

. . .   Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB) investigators were at the accident site

within hours of the Dryden crash.                           

 However,   intense public controversy raged​ . . .     

The CASB Dryden inquiry . . .  was halted by

the Minister of Transport,  who opted for

a   public  inquiry. . . .

 the Government of Canada,

facing   mounting  public criticism . . .

 replaced  the CASB   with  

a  Commission of Inquiry   under the   Inquiries Act

 to investigate the Dryden accident. . . .  

The CASB Chief Investigator   and  most of his team  

were seconded to the Commission  . . .  

 Using  a Commission   in this way is rare   and

was done  to restore credibility  to                    

the aviation accident investigative process  . . . 


. . .  Credible investigation must be independent and dignified  (without appearing elitist),   transparent  and without constraint.   Most importantly,  it must be perceived by the public as free from vested influence.  

Effectiveness of the Judiciary

  It can be argued that  the judiciary  is uniquely positioned to resolve these issues.    

A Commission of Inquiry   under the  Inquiries Act,

       unlike an investigative body such as

            CASB   or ...  TSB      

  vests in Commissioners:​

  - -  All the powers of a superior court judge;

  - -   Freedom and independence from

            political or governmental influence . . .


Five laws need repair -- IG review for NTSB-AAR's

Historic   mistakes    in  USA

 Aircraft  Accident  Investigation

Cite  this case,   ID,    or    click-copy   the  image below:  

                 RETRACTION     or      Expression-of-Concern

Since the NTSB refused to comply  with  their   MIM   &  §845.41:

    "under certain circumstances"    correction-retraction

                                 by   "other responsible  persons"  

         is  a step  to   recognition-acknowledgement    of   such  published   investigator-err,  and   scientific misconduct.

Justice Mahon, right-side view

Investigative   Safeguards

Failure - Interactions

Correcting    erroneous   findings

                                in a  botched   NTSB AAR

   The  model wording   for 

         revising   a future  §845.32  "Petitions" 

​                                               is  shown  in current law,

     see the detailed   "response"  obligations    listed in §1135:

Those  detailed  "response" obligations, as stated in §1135,  could

     end the current NTSB-staff practice of   buried  Petitions .

NTSB's   Apr' 2017 celebration    of   that 1997  court decision

that implicitly sanctioned  Scientific Misconduct   inside NTSB.

Gibson v. NTSB : the court lacked jurisdiction, implying that NTSB is freed of any oversight.

“Properly conducted

        misconduct  investigations

should be seen   as   a badge of honour,

not something you’re embarrassed about. . . .

However that’s not always how the public perceives it,   or the way it’s written up . . .

Institutions may also worry    that their definitions of   misconduct and … investigation  

differ from those of other institutions . . . “

“I think  it’s completely improbable …   to say

   we have had no cases.

It’s  just  not  credible”.                           

Elizabeth Wager. . .  member of UKRIO’s advisory board.
Nature  521, 271(21 May 2015)

 Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

 ...  We do not have  ...  jurisdiction

           to  review     the NTSB's action.

                Jurisdiction   is a question of law ...

     ...  no court  has  directly addressed the issue

     whether     Title 49 U.S.C.   § 1153,

        the   Independent Safety Board Act,

                   grants   jurisdiction   over   an NTSB denial   of a petition ...

  court decision  =   courts lack jurisdiction

     courts'lack jurisdiction in law  ≠   science victory

               this   court case  only raised more doubts

                     about  quality of  NTSB's  products.

Correcting  the  

           Scientific  Record

 Standards  for    RETRACTION    after  publication:  

dealing   with    Investigator-Err,      Scientific Misconduct          

Dec'2015  NTSB  Rule CHANGE:  

      further  confuses  the  "Board of Inquiry"  concept,

              muddling  the above  law

                      with the NTSB's new   Rules of Practice § 845.5

NTSB  has  lacked  basic  foundations  of    

         a   scientific  organization:

   No  Scientific Ombudsman.

    No  IG  - review  of   any  NTSB-AAR.

     No  peer review process to  identify  investigator-err.

       No  disclosure  of  those   protest   Petitions  buried by  staff-managers.

                    Petitions   are    reconsidered    ONLY  by

                                           NTSB's  own  board members   &  staff  :

                                                         an   intangible   conflict-of-interest.

         No  acknowledgement  of  employee  Scientific Misconduct.

​           No defined  oversight role  for  Board Members.